Fighting to Get Along

Our theories on interservice rivalry are wrong. Why, in the midst of one of the largest draw downs in military history are the services working so closely? Has the bureaucratic process suddenly changed? Or were we just looking at the wrong factors? Most organizational theorists view interservice interaction from the perspective of the Washington, DC bureaucratic and political arena. Their bureaucratic and political outlook has all but filtered out the fundamental service interaction process from view. Removed from the battlefield and operational environment, these theorists have thus missed the root factors that actually govern how the services interact. War fighting doctrine and the proper distribution of combat power on the battlefield are the two root factors that operational military commanders are concerned about. The proper application of these factors assures physical survival for the country and the minimum loss of life to allied forces. The focus of this study is the examination of the two primary variables that shape service interaction. Operational war fighting doctrine is the first and primary factor. The secondary factor is the desired equitable or efficient distribution of combat power in a theater of operation. This study shows how these two variables combine to define four categories of service interaction. These categories are cooperative, competitive, adversarial and toleration. Air support of combat troops is examined during the Korean, Vietnamese, and Gulf Wars.