Disengagement Operations

The U.S. Armed Forces has a long and rich history of expeditionary operations followed by military disengagements. A historically small U.S. military is repeating this history today in two wars that are stretching it to the limits of its personnel and materiel capacity. Concurrently, senior leaders predict a future where the military will grow slowly while its global requirements will persist. Thus, for the U.S. Armed Forces to remain responsive to global demands in the future, its leaders must understand military disengagement operations so that they can successfully extricate scarce combat power from global operations as quickly as strategically and operationally practicable. Much of the debate on this topic occurs under the moniker "Phase IV" operations. This term has its roots in doctrinal references that depict Phase III as major military operations, and all Phases thereafter depict some lesser expenditure of military effort and significance. Using this term reflects the ambiguity that exists in contemporary understanding of post conflict operations. Other similar terms such as "winning the peace" or "operations after the campaign" reflect similar ambiguity, the latter further revealing the inability of today's military to fit disengagement operations into a broad campaign context. Disengagement operations is a definable construct that can fill the gap in military understanding and planning of operation that follow major combat engagements because it is likely to be the only constant in all future "Phase IV" operations. Understanding disengagement therefore may become the best way to lure military leader away from their predilection towards Phase III and lack of preparedness for what follows. Anticipating disengagement operations compels these leaders to consider the ends, ways, and means necessary to return forces to their pre-conflict strategic posture before they become engaged in war. Furthermore, anticipating disengagement compels these leaders to concept