Well-Being

In Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life, Neera K. Badhwar offers a new argument for the ancient claim that well-being as the highest prudential goodeudaimoniaconsists of happiness in a virtuous life. Virtue is a source of happiness, but happiness also requires external goods. The argument takes into account recent work on happiness, well-being, and virtue, and defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue as an integrated, but limited, intellectual-emotional-action disposition. These conceptions of well-being and virtue are argued to be widely-held and compatible with experimental psychology. Badhwars main argument for the thesis that well-being as the highest prudential good requires virtue is as follows: (i) well-being as the highest prudential good requires an objectively worthwhile life; (ii) such a life entails realism as a character trait; (iii) realism entails a life of virtue; (iv) hence well-being as the highest prudential good requires a life of virtue. A realistic person understands important aspects of her own life and human life in general, and is disposed to act on her understanding. Her understanding springs from her autonomy and reality-orientation, i.e., her disposition to think for herself and seek truth or understanding. But the demands of virtue in the face of our emotional and cognitive limitations make complete virtue impossible, and this is one reason why complete well-being is also impossible.